In brand licensing, the brand owner (the licensor) grants another firm (the licensee) the right to use the brand. This differs from franchising, in which a contractual arrangement between a franchisor and a franchisee exists to run a business based on the franchisor's business model. Brand licensing helps generate revenues and protect the brand from misappropriation. In such contractual arrangements, agency theory suggests that when parties to the contract engage in moral hazard (i.e., opportunistic behavior), suboptimal outcomes may result. The authors examine how concerns of moral hazard affect royalty rate, a popular form of compensation in brand licensing. From an agency theory perspective, they discuss how market and contract characteristics influence the risk of moral hazard and shape royalty rates in international brand licensing. The results obtained using data from international licensing contracts indicate that a country's intellectual property rights protection enables licensees to benefit from lower royalty rates and market size enables licensors to demand higher royalty rates. The authors also examine impact of other contract characteristics, such as contract duration and exclusivity, on royalty rate. The results imply that concerns of opportunistic behavior on the part of both the licensor and the licensee influence royalty rates.
T
he marketing literature has examined at length the importance of building strong brands. Extensive research has demonstrated the ability of strong brand assets to influence a range of performance indicators, including shareholder wealth (Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer 2011; Kallapur and Kwan 2004; Wiles, Morgan, and Rego 2012) , cash flow (Morgan and Rego 2009; Morgan, Slotegraaf, and Vorhies 2009) , and customer loyalty (Morgan and Rego 2009) . Leveraging brand assets to capture new opportunities is a key strategic imperative for marketers (Day 2011) . In addition, given the value embedded in brands, firms strive to protect brand assets (Gillespie, Krishna, and Jarvis 2002) .
Firms can leverage brands for growth by launching new products or entering new geographic markets (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999) . When a firm deploys a brand for growth in a new product category or market, it can do so under its own auspices or contract the brand to an external entity. Brand licensing is the process in which the firm that owns a brand (the licensor) enters into an agreement with another firm (the licensee) to manufacture, promote, distribute, or sell products using the brand name (Battersby and Simon 2010) . In return for licensing the brand, the brand owner receives a payment, often a royalty, determined as a percentage of the revenues generated through the licensed asset. A licensing contract defines the terms of use of the asset, such as compensation to the licensor and geographic restrictions.
Brand licensing is different from franchising, a contractual arrangement between a franchisor and a franchisee to run a business using the franchisor's business model. As such, the franchisee's operations are subject to considerable control by the franchisor through the use of operations manuals, site approval, personnel policies, accounting procedures, co-op advertising, operations training, and so on (Choo 2005) . Licensees, in contrast, receive considerably more autonomy regarding their business activities, which often involve the use of the brand to enter an unrelated business area (e.g., McDonald's franchising for its stores vs. Caterpillar licensing for toys). As Sherman (2004, p. 348) observes, "The licensor's interest is normally limited to supervising the proper use of the license and collecting royalties. The franchisor, however, exerts significant active control over the franchisee's operations." Franchising also involves much more stringent reporting requirements than licensing and a mandatory fee (Sherman 2004) . Underscoring the difference, from a legal perspective, franchising falls under the purview of securities law, whereas licensing falls under contract law.
Brand licensing has become increasingly popular, with worldwide revenues of $187. 2013). Licensed products are estimated to make up between 25% and 35% of toy industry sales (Friedman 2004) . Disney Consumer Products was the largest licensor, with $28.6 billion in retail sales from licensed properties in 2010, more than doubling its revenue from licensing over a ten-year period (Lisanti 2011) . Licensing revenues are often a significant part of a company's total revenues. The consumer products firm Cadbury (now owned by Kraft Foods), for example, earned approximately 20% of its revenue by licensing its brands (Bass 2004) . Examples of brand licensing abound. In 2008, Starbucks entered into a licensing deal with Unilever to manufacture and market Starbucks ice cream in the United States and Canada. Starbucks also has a joint licensing agreement with Unilever and PepsiCo to manufacture and market Tazo ready-to-drink beverages (Starbucks 2008) . Jamba Juice, known for its retail operations, licensed its name to Zola for Jamba Daily Superfruit Shots (Gorgo 2011) . John Deere, which operates primarily in the agricultural machinery industry, earns royalty revenues by licensing its name to makers of toys and apparel. Sunkist, a popular brand of citrus products, has been licensed to more than 40 food and beverage companies worldwide to manufacture and market products under the Sunkist name (Sunkist 2013) .
Licensing a brand, as we have noted, is a means for the firm to deploy a valuable asset to generate revenues. However, licensing also enables firms to protect brands in international markets. There are numerous examples that highlight the risk that a brand faces when it is not used in a market, even though it may be registered. E.J. Gallo, a wine manufacturer, lost a lawsuit in Australia over the rights to use the name "Barefoot Cellars" in that market because it had not been used for a period of three years (Managing Intellectual Property 2010) . Starbucks registered its brand in Russia in 1997 but did not open any stores immediately. In 2002, after a lawsuit, Russian authorities revoked Starbucks' claim to its trademark in Russia because it had not been used for commercial purposes in that country. Starbucks regained the rights to its brand in 2005, after Russia changed its intellectual property (IP) rights law (Kramer 2007) . In situations in which a firm does not want to enter a country directly, it might be helpful for it to license the brand to retain brand rights.
Interorganizational arrangements such as licensing depend on the inputs of both firms involved (Wimmer and Garen 1997) . Licensor inputs include a valuable asset-the brand-and other support to help the licensee market the licensed products. The licensee, in turn, uses its knowledge and resources to generate business with the licensed brand. Because the licensor and the licensee both provide valuable inputs, the success of brand licensing depends on whether the arrangement meets the goals of both parties. The licensor's objectives include leveraging the brand for growth while ensuring that its value is protected. The licensee's primary goal is to develop a profitable business using the licensed brand. These goals may not overlap perfectly, which leads to the potential for either party to engage in opportunistic behavior. For example, licensees may not share the brand owner's long-term interest in protecting the brand (Colucci, Montaguti, and Lago 2008) . Consequently, they might use the brand indiscriminately to maximize short-term revenues, resulting in damage to its value. If licensors perceive that their interests are not being met because revenues are insufficient or the brand is at risk, they may withhold support from the licensee (Quelch 1985) . If so, licensees would not be able to maximize the returns from their investment and efforts. Thus, the viability of brand licensing depends on reducing the possibility of such opportunistic behavior by either party to the agreement.
Creating goal alignment through incentives is one way to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior (Wimmer and Garen 1997) . The key incentive in brand licensing is the royalty rate, which can serve as a mechanism to reduce the risk perceived by either party. Licensors benefit from a high royalty rate, whereas licensees gain from a low royalty rate. Therefore, the royalty rate could be used to align interests in an agency agreement and manage the risk of opportunistic behavior (Agrawal and Lal 1995) . The possibility of parties engaging in opportunistic behavior in a contract varies across countries (Lafontaine and Oxley 2001; Marron and Steel 2000) . Thus, brand licensing royalty rates might differ across country markets. In this article, we examine the variation in brand licensing royalty rates across international markets as a function of market and contract characteristics that influence risk perceptions of opportunistic behavior.
Risk management in international brand licensing is important to marketing scholars and managers because licensing has increased in popularity. However, there is limited prior research on brand licensing. As an exception, Colucci, Montaguti, and Lago (2008) examine the likelihood of brand licensing in the high-end fashion industry. The related literature in franchising has addressed the persistence of contract terms over time (Lafontaine and Shaw 1999) , the mortality of franchises (Shane and Foo 1999) , ex post behavior as a function of contractual and extracontractual incentives (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) , the effect of royalty rate on monitoring and retail service levels (Agrawal and Lal 1995) , and the relationship between fee and royalty rate (Kaufman and Dant 2001) . With regard to the disparity in franchising royalty rates across countries, Lafontaine and Oxley (2001) find that there is little variation across the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Dant, Perrigot, and Cliquet (2008) show that franchising royalty rates are higher in Brazil than in the United States and France. Apart from these limited cross-country comparisons, we are not aware of research exploring the variation of royalty rate across international markets, especially in the context of brand licensing.
Against this background, our study examines how brand licensing royalty rates vary as a function of country and contract characteristics. We address this issue from an agency theory perspective (Jensen and Meckling 1976) , which involves the risk of postcontractual opportunism. Using data obtained from 93 brand-licensing contracts from numerous countries, we find that royalty rates vary across country markets on the basis of how market conditions affect the risk of opportunistic behavior by the licensor and licensee. When IP rights are offered sufficient protection in a market, the licensee is incentivized through low royalty rates. However, when IP rights are not well protected, licensors are compelled to monitor more extensively for brand violation and factor the cost of monitoring into higher royalty rates. Market size increases the risk of opportunistic behavior by the licensor and, consequently, leads to the licensee paying higher royalty rates to incentivize the licensor. We also find that contract duration and exclusivity result in lower royalty rates. From the perspective of the licensor, the results underscore the need to balance brand protection and revenue generation when licensing a brand. The licensee gains insights that enable it to protect its interests in a licensing contract. Overall, the results demonstrate the potential use of incentives and monitoring to manage agency problems in brand licensing.
In this article, we provide one of the few academic treatments of brand licensing. We test the hypotheses using data obtained from brand licensing contracts from a variety of industries. The use of actual contract data to examine agency theory predictions is rare in the marketing literature (for an exception, see Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) . From a managerial perspective, our findings provide guidance to brand managers about protecting brand assets in global markets by enhancing understanding of the drivers of royalty rates in brand licensing.
Brand Licensing
Brand licensing enables a firm to accomplish multiple goals. First, firms can use licensing to generate revenues by extending the brand without the expense of a direct entry (Colucci, Montaguti, and Lago 2008) . Intellectual property protection laws stipulate that mere registration of the brand in a market is not enough to maintain brand ownership after a grace period of three to five years (World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] 2013). Therefore, it is often necessary for firms to use a brand to retain rights to the name in a foreign country market, and licensing can accomplish this at a lower cost than direct entry. In short, apart from revenue generation, licensing also helps the licensor retain rights to a brand in a market when direct entry is deemed unattractive. Furthermore, used appropriately, licensing can help enhance the brand's equity in new markets.
Despite these advantages, firms must ensure that licensing does not lead to brand dilution. Concerns of brand dilution assume greater importance when the brand is licensed because of the agency arrangement between licensors and licensees (for a detailed discussion of agency relationships, see Jensen and Meckling 1976) . According to agency theory, a bilateral contract (used in brand licensing) has a principal (the licensor) and an agent (the licensee) who acts on behalf of the licensor. Contracts specify how each party to the agreement is expected to carry out its obligations. However, these contracts tend to be incomplete, and even more so when property rights are difficult to define precisely, as is the case with IP (Anand and Khanna 2000) . Agency relationships, therefore, could face "moral hazard," or postcontractual opportunism, in which one party acts in its own self-interest at the expense of the other party and violates expected norms of behavior (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . Agency theory provides a useful framework to address how contracts can be structured ex ante to reduce ex post costs from opportunistic behavior (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) . In brand licensing, both the licensee and the licensor may behave opportunistically, leading to a two-sided moral hazard problem (Bhattacharyya and LaFontaine 1995; Brickley 2002; LaFontaine 1992) . We discuss this issue next.
Opportunistic Behavior in Brand Licensing
Agency problems arise because of lack of alignment of goals, varying risk preferences, and information asymmetry (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) . Perfect alignment of interests between the licensor and the licensee may be rare in brand licensing. For example, licensors' goals include protecting and enhancing the brand while earning additional revenues. In many cases, revenues should be secondary to ensuring that the brand is not diluted through unsuitable licensing arrangements (Bass 2004) . However, analogous to what Dant and Nasr (1998) observe in the context of franchising, the licensee, compared with the licensor, may afford less importance to protecting the brand. Opportunistic licensees may take advantage of licensors' investments in the brand by shirking efforts to maintain quality, as some have observed in franchising (see Garg and Rasheed 2003) .
Reflecting this concern, a licensing industry trade magazine states, "It's difficult to imagine that something that can mean so much as your brand/property has to be given over to entities that do not necessarily share the same motives of growing long term brand value. But that's exactly what licensing executives face every day" (McCandlish 2002, p. 6) . A licensee may offer products of lower quality than originally agreed on, sell through inappropriate distribution channels, or offer low prices in its markets, which can alter the brand's positioning (Lieberstein and Lord 2010) . By doing so, the licensee hopes to lower its cost of operations and enhance profits, thereby essentially free riding on the licensor's investments in the brand. Furthermore, accurate and timely information regarding the licensee's transgressions may not be easily available to the licensor, especially when brands are licensed in foreign markets, where monitoring for violations can be expensive. The costs incurred by the licensor to protect its brand are numerous. Apart from the costs associated with any of the licensee's breaches, they also include the cost of finding a replacement for a failed licensing arrangement (Reily 2001a, b) .
Overall, licensors face the risk of inappropriate use of the brand that could damage its equity. For example, Izod's brand value faded because its licensees failed to meet quality standards (Quelch 1985) . As a reflection of the misalignment of licensor-licensee interests, disputes regarding improper use of the brand by the licensee are not uncommon. For example, Dr Pepper Snapple Group sued its licensee, Dublin Dr Pepper of Dublin, Texas, for inappropriate use of the brand name (Conrad 2011) .
Concerns of moral hazard are not limited to the licensor. Licensees may be apprehensive about insufficient support from the licensor (e.g., long and difficult approval processes, wrangling over previously agreed-on cooperative
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Brand Licensing: What Drives Royalty Rates? / 111 marketing assistance, slow or no technical assistance). The licensor might shirk support if a larger share of the benefits from the contract accrues to the licensee (Quelch 1985) . Furthermore, the licensor may enter the market directly or replace the licensee. For example, Kraft sued Starbucks (which licensed the brand to Kraft for packaged coffee) for ending a licensing arrangement in which Kraft claimed it increased Starbucks's share of total packaged coffee sales from .9% in 1998 to 10.6% in 2010 ( Van Voris 2011) . In such circumstances, the licensee risks its investment in manufacturing and marketing the licensed product.
In summary, there is potential for two-sided moral hazard in brand licensing (Bhattacharyya and LaFontaine 1995; Brickley 2002; LaFontaine 1992) , in which the licensee may act in ways that dilute the brand's equity and the licensor may shirk support to the licensee. Both "sides" of moral hazard occur because of insufficient alignment of interests. Therefore, it is important to limit the risk of opportunistic behavior by balancing the interests of both parties.
Mitigating Moral Hazard in Brand Licensing
The risk of moral hazard can be managed through incentives that align the interests of the licensor and licensee and by monitoring behavior (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . Aligning interests ensures that the parties to the agreement perceive that proceeds from the relationship are equitably distributed. Monitoring reduces information asymmetry between the partners, enabling remedial procedures that rein in opportunistic behavior. Licensing experts advocate for licensors to constantly monitor product quality, distribution, sales, and marketing by the licensee to guard against brand dilution (Fraley 2004 ). However, monitoring and subsequent legal solutions are expensive and difficult, especially when the licensee is in a foreign market subject to different legal standards (Fladmoe-Lindquist 1996) . In addition, monitoring may impair trust between the parties (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) . These problems highlight the significance of financial incentives in aligning interests to limit moral hazard.
The most significant financial incentive in brand licensing is the royalty rate. On the one hand, if the royalty rate is high, the risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of the licensee (e.g., inappropriate use of the property, use of creative accounting techniques to retain more of the revenues) increases (Caves, Crookell, and Killing 1983) . On the other hand, if the royalty rate is low, the licensor may renege on providing support to the licensee or even enter the market directly. Royalty rates, therefore, should be based on the need to balance the incentives of both parties to the contract (Agrawal and Lal 1995) . The risk of opportunistic behavior varies by the market conditions that influence the potential for behavior that violates expected norms (Lafontaine and Shaw 1999) . Consequently, it is likely that royalty rate could vary across international markets. To examine this issue, we develop hypotheses in the next section.
Hypotheses Development
Given the paucity of prior research, we interviewed managers involved in brand licensing to understand their perspectives on royalty rate variation. As noted previously, we propose that disparity in licensors' ability to protect brands and generate revenues in different country markets is associated with variation in royalty rates. Therefore, in the interviews, we focused on understanding how managers view brand licensing in an international context.
Managerial Interviews
Interviews with licensing firms. First, we interviewed 64 managers from 22 business-to-business and 28 business-toconsumer licensor firms. Some of these executives were members of the marketing roundtable organized by a leading research university, and others were marketing executives of Global Fortune 1000 firms. We conducted 36 faceto-face interviews with members of the marketing roundtable and 28 telephone interviews with executives of Global Fortune 1000 firms. Eight executives were based in Europe; the rest, in the United States. There were two respondents each from 14 firms and one respondent each from the remaining firms.
Most managers stressed the importance of protecting IP. Not surprisingly, they stated that brands were at greater risk in countries that do not offer sufficient protection for IP. Managers said that in markets that offer relatively low levels of protection for brands (e.g., Brazil), they might consider a higher royalty rate to recoup the higher costs of monitoring. Some managers believed that market size is also a determinant of the royalty rate, with higher rates desired in larger markets to make up for the greater opportunity cost of not entering directly. They frequently cited duration of the contract as a factor firms consider when determining royalty rates.
Interviews with licensee firms. Next, we interviewed 36 managers from 14 business-to-business and 16 business-toconsumer licensee firms. We obtained the names of the executives from a list of marketing executives sold by a professional firm. We sought their opinions pertaining to issues governing brand licensing and royalty rates. Licensees were uneasy about licensors not providing adequate support, threatening to enter directly, or appointing other licensees. Overall, licensees were concerned about having sufficient opportunity to recover the investment required to build the business using the licensed brand.
In summary, the interviews provided evidence regarding concerns of moral hazard among both licensor and licensee firms. In the following section, we use these insights to support our conceptual model.
Conceptual Model
We investigate how concerns of moral hazard lead to variation in royalty rates across country markets by using a framework developed from the international business literature, which suggests that institutional, economic, and cultural characteristics determine the behavior of firms in foreign markets (Xu and Shenkar 2002) . Not surprisingly, these factors are relevant in the use of IP (Marron and Steel 2000) . Economic characteristics influence the entry and performance of firms in foreign markets (Dunning 1993) . Institutional arrangements in foreign markets also have an impact on the performance and behavior of firms (Jackson and Deeg 2008; Kostova and Zaheer 1999) . In this context, the term "institution" implies the "the rules of conduct" designed to control human interaction (North 1990 )-the regulative, normative, and cognitive forces that shape firm behavior (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002; Scott 1995) . Cultural factors play a role in shaping the behavior of firms in foreign markets (e.g., Hofstede 1980) . Consistent with the international business literature, we suggest that institutional, economic, and cultural characteristics in the licensee's market(s) influence the risk of moral hazard and, thereby, royalty rates. The specific market characteristics we consider are IP rights protection (IPRP; institutional), market size (economic), and uncertainty avoidance (UA; cultural). We chose these characteristics because they drive the risk perceptions of the licensor or licensee (or both) and, thus, the variation in royalty rate. In addition, we introduce contract-related factors that may have an impact on royalty rates. Last, we control for other variables that may influence royalty rates. Figure 1 depicts the hypotheses, described in the following subsections.
Institutional Factor: IPRP
Intellectual property includes "any sign that individualizes the goods of a given enterprise and distinguishes them from the goods of its competitors" (WIPO 2013, p. 68) . The term encompasses trademarks such as brand names that provide firms with the right to market products under recognized names and symbols; they may be denied registration only if they lack distinctive character or run counter to morality and public order. 1 Intellectual property rights are the legal strictures or rules of conduct through which property is instituted in intellectual assets; they determine the degree to which the holders of IP rights may prevent others from activities that violate the property (Maskus 2000) . In general, IP rights are protected on the basis of registration and use. If firms do not use a registered brand within a grace period of three to five years, they risk losing the right to the property (WIPO 2013, p. 77) . Therefore, and as we noted previously, licensing helps firms protect their brands in markets that they do not intend to enter directly.
The global protection of IP rights has been enhanced by the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights guided by the World Trade Organization (Maskus 2000) . In this context, IPRP is the degree to which a country formulates and enforces policies based on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Despite the World Trade Organization's efforts, there is substantial variation across countries in the extent of protection afforded to IP . In countries in which IPRP is strong, licensors can rely on the regulatory system to help prevent or control inappropriate use of their brand. Therefore, the risk of damage to the brand from opportunistic behavior by the licensee will be greater in markets with weak IPRP. As we observed previously, licensors can control the risk of moral hazard through incentives or monitoring. In general, firms prefer incentives because monitoring is complex and expensive, especially in foreign markets (FladmoeLindquist 1996; Roth and O'Donnell 1996) . Consequently, when IPRP is high, licensors motivate licensees through low royalty rates to limit opportunistic behavior rather than monitor them closely. However, in markets of low IPRP, moral hazard on the part of licensees is more likely and more consequential because it is more difficult to seek legal redress. Thus, the licensor would gain greater marginal benefit from monitoring to limit transgressions in markets with low IPRP. Consequently, brand licensors are likely to invest more in monitoring in markets with low IPRP and try to be compensated for these costs (Shane 1998) , resulting in higher royalty rates. In this regard, in franchising, Penard, Reynaud, and Saussier (2003) argue that high royalty rates motivate more monitoring to protect the brand name. Indeed, Agrawal and Lal (1995) find royalty rate to be positively associated with monitoring in the franchising context. Therefore, we posit the following:
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FIGURE 1 Conceptual Model
The level of IPRP in the licensee's market is negatively related to the royalty rate.
Economic Factor: Market Size "Market size" refers to the extent to which business from licensed products can generate profits and has the opportunity to grow. Research in the area of foreign direct investment suggests that the host country's market size is positively associated with investment inflows (Caves 1996; Dunning 1993) . With a larger market size, the licensee has an opportunity to build a larger business with the licensed brand. Therefore, as market size increases, the licensee also benefits to a greater extent from licensor support to protect and enhance the value of the brand. However, licensors might shirk support for licensees if a greater portion of the returns from the licensing arrangement accrues to licensees (Quelch 1985) . As we heard during executive interviews, licensors may also be tempted to enter larger markets directly if they perceive that licensees are benefiting disproportionately from the licensing agreement. In other words, for a licensor, the opportunity cost of not entering directly increases with market size. Consequently, the risk of moral hazard on the part of licensors increases with market size. In addition, the marginal value of the licensor's support also increases with market size. Therefore, in larger markets, the licensee will accept higher royalty rates to prevent the licensor from shirking support or entering directly. As Caves, Crookell, and Killing (1983) note in the context of technology licensing, if the potential market is lucrative, the licensee often pays more. Overall:
H 2 : Market size in the licensee's market is positively related to royalty rate.
Moderating Effect of Market Size on the IPRP-Royalty Rate Relationship
In markets with strong IPRP, brands receive superior legal protection from violation. Consequently, there is less need for monitoring in those markets, and the licensee should benefit from relatively lower royalty rates because licensors prefer using incentives to monitoring. In countries for which IPRP is high and market size is large, the licensor's contributions become more significant. As noted previously, in larger markets, the licensor is also more likely to perceive that the licensee benefits disproportionately from the licensing arrangement and might behave opportunistically unless a higher royalty is paid. Thus, the licensor will receive a higher royalty rate in high-IPRP/large markets than in high-IPRP/small markets. However, a corresponding change with market size is less likely in low-IPRP markets. Licensors in a low-IPRP market that are concerned about protecting the brand are likely to spend more on monitoring and demand a higher royalty rate to offset the monitoring costs. In these markets, raising the royalty rate beyond that required for the costs of monitoring will reduce licensee incentives further, perhaps making it difficult for the licensor to find a trustworthy licensee. Therefore, there may not be a corresponding increase in royalty rate with size for low-IPRP markets compared with the increase for high-IPRP markets. Overall, the negative relationship between IPRP and royalty rate will be attenuated by market size, primarily because of the change in royalty rate in high-IPRP markets.
H 3 : The negative relationship between IPRP and royalty rate is positively moderated by market size.
Cultural Factor: Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)
Cultural factors play a role in shaping firm behavior in international markets. Hofstede (1980) identifies several cultural mechanisms that are important in the foreign market context: UA, long-term orientation, masculinity, power distance, and collectivism. Uncertainty avoidance is a reflection of how a society deals with the perception of risk that arises from the lack of clarity of future events (Hofstede 1980) . The higher the level of UA in a culture, the more people are likely to favor a predictable environment and feel threatened by ambiguity (Chui and Kwok 2008) . Agency contracts, as in brand licensing, carry a certain degree of ambiguity in terms of their success. Because of their sensitivity to ambiguity, licensees in high-UA cultures, compared with those in low-UA cultures, are more apt to protect their own interests than those of the licensor. Therefore, licensees in high-UA cultures may seek greater compensation to enter licensing contracts and make the requisite investments. In effect, when licensing in a high-UA culture, the brand licensor may need to accept a lower royalty rate for the licensee to perceive that their interests are aligned. Thus:
H 4 : Uncertainty avoidance in the licensee market is negatively related to royalty rate.
However, as market size increases, the contributions of the licensor will increase in value, and the licensee will become more wary of the licensor reneging on terms of the agreement, as we discussed previously in the context of IPRP. In addition, as noted for the interaction of market size and IPRP, as market size increases, the opportunity cost for not entering directly will increase and potentially offset the influence of UA on royalty rate. Licensors offer a lower royalty rate in high-UA countries than in low-UA countries, and they can try to increase this rate when market size increases.
H 5 : The relationship between UA and royalty rate is positively moderated by market size.
We do not consider the other dimensions of culture in this study, because they are unlikely to influence uncertainty regarding opportunistic behavior and, thus, royalty rates. For example, power distance is the extent to which a culture accepts inequality in groups. Collectivism is the degree to which ties between members of a society are strong. Masculinity as a dimension captures the distribution of gender roles within a society. Long-term orientation refers to principles related to Confucianism, in which "the importance of perseverance and thrift, the respect of tradition and family values, honoring parents and ancestors and providing them financial support, are of paramount importance" (Park and Lemaire 2011, p. 5) . Apart from UA, none of the other dimensions is likely to affect risk perceptions in the context of a licensing contract. Consequently, we consider UA the only cultural dimension likely to influence contracting behavior and determine royalty rate.
Contract Characteristics: Contract Duration and Contract Exclusivity
Contract duration and contract exclusivity are likely to influence royalty rates. With longer-term and exclusive contracts, licensors depend to a greater extent on the licensee to protect the brand by using it appropriately. Exclusive contracts and contracts of longer duration may also signal the licensor's attempt to incentivize a competent and reliable licensee, which is particularly important from the perspective of brand protection. For these reasons, duration and exclusivity should be negatively related to royalty rate. An alternative perspective is that in return for offering exclusivity and a longer-term contract, the licensor should expect a higher royalty rate. This might indeed be true if brand protection is not a major concern. If brand protection concerns are paramount, however, exclusive contracts and longer duration contracts will result in lower royalty rates. In an international brand-licensing context, we argue that brand protection is an important consideration. Thus: H 6 : Contract duration is negatively related to royalty rate. H 7 : Exclusivity is negatively related to royalty rate.
A contract has other features that can influence royalty rates. In some licensing contracts, the licensee guarantees a certain level of sales. Some licensing contracts also have licensees agreeing to a minimum payment, an advance payment, or both. It is possible that sales guarantee and minimum and advance payment influence royalty rates. To elaborate, consistent with an agency theory perspective, sales guarantees and minimum and advance payments may serve as bonds that give the licensor greater confidence in the licensee, reduce the need for monitoring, and thus lead to lower royalty rates.
H 8 : Sales guarantee is negatively related to royalty rate. H 9 : Advance payment is negatively related to royalty rate. H 10 : Minimum payment is negatively related to royalty rate.
Control Variables: Licensor or Licensee Characteristics
We control for licensor characteristics that may affect royalty rates. As our interviewees pointed out, extremely competent licensors are more likely to create contracts that favor themselves. Therefore, we use the licensor's capability-its competence in dealing with licensees-as a control variable, because more skilled licensors may receive a higher royalty rate.
The reputation of a brand is its standing in its primary industry relative to its competitors. The branding literature supports the argument that brands with a stronger reputation should generate higher royalty rates because they enable licensees to build more successful businesses (e.g., Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999). However, firms may use licensing with the primary purpose of retaining legal rights to the brand, as we noted previously. In addition, if brand protection is a significant concern, the reliability of the licensee will be a major consideration. If so, the licensor may consider revenues from the licensing contract of secondary importance to protecting the brand and settle for a lower royalty rate to incentivize a reliable licensee. Consistent with this argument, licensors offer lower royalty rates to licensees that offer high quality standards (Quelch 1985) . Consequently, firms that have a stronger desire to protect their brand may offer lower royalty rates as an incentive to avoid moral hazard on the part of their licensees. In this regard, the value in protecting a brand increases with its reputation, and a negative relationship between brand reputation and royalty rate is possible if brand protection concerns dominate. Overall, if brand protection is of paramount interest when the brand is licensed, brand reputation can be negatively associated with royalty rates. However, if revenue generation concerns dominate, stronger brands should result in higher royalty rates for the licensor.
Data and Measures
Data
We obtained most of the data to test our hypotheses from RoyaltyStat, which has compiled a database of license agreements from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR archive. Clients such as tax authorities of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, universities, corporations, and accounting, consulting, and law firms use the RoyaltyStat database for issues related to transfer pricing and royalty assessment. The contracts from RoyaltyStat provide data on royalty rate, contract duration, country markets covered, and other characteristics of the agreement. Several contracts covered multiple countries, in which case, we focused on those that were largely drawn for socioeconomically similar countries (e.g., United States and Canada). Regardless, we assess the potential effect of multicountry contracts on the results
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using a dummy variable. We collected ratings of brand reputation and licensor capability from experts in the licensing industry and obtained country-market characteristics from secondary sources.
The contracts spanned several industries, such as food and beverages, apparel, furniture, perfume, and services. The countries represented included Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland, France, Mexico, China, Italy, Germany, Japan, Hong Kong, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, South Korea, Australia, Portugal, Singapore, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Finland, Norway, Monaco, Brazil, Israel, Austria, Belgium, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Thailand, Greece, Poland, Sweden, Kuwait, Denmark, Serbia, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Mongolia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and India. Our final sample had 93 contracts. Of the contracts, 71 were exclusive, 46 had minimum payment requirements, 16 had sales guarantees, and 9 had advance payment requirements. Table 1 lists the industries' Standard Industrial Classification codes.
Measures
Royalty rate and contract duration. We measured royalty rate (RR) as a percentage of sales revenue generated by the licensee using the licensed brand name. We measured contract duration (CD) in years as provided in the contract.
When the duration of the contract was indefinite, we considered it 99 years.
Country characteristics. We obtained the data on countries from external sources. We used gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for market size (MS) in the licensed markets (Asiedu and Esfahani 2001) . We obtained the GDP figures for the nations where the licensee received permission to operate from the International Monetary Fund's (2007) World Economic Outlook Database. We aggregated the GDP measures for each market when the contract pertained to multiple countries. We also correlated GDP measures with total royalty and license fee payments from country markets for all licensing and franchising contracts as obtained from the World Bank database. 2 We obtained a significant correlation of .50 (p < .001), which confirms that the GDP measure of a market reflects the potential for licensing a brand.
We measured the IPRP in a country using data collected by the Property Rights Alliance (www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org). Intellectual property rights consist of four aspects: (1) protection of IP rights, a survey measure of opinion of business leaders about the protection a nation affords to IP rights (source: World Economic Forum); (2) patent strength, or protection afforded to patents (source: Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights; Ginarte and Park 1997) ; (3) copyright piracy, comprising information on piracy level in four separate industries, including business software, records and music, motion pictures, and entertainment software (source: United States Trade Representative's Special 301 Report); and (4) trademark protection, or expert opinion regarding the registration, maintenance, and enforcement of trademark rights (source: International Trademark Association's Report). We rated each of these subfactors on a ten-point scale, with 10 as the highest level of protection for IP, in line with prior literature, which has used similar indexes to capture property rights (e.g., Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 2002) . We obtained the data for UA from Geert Hofstede's listing of cultural index values (International Business Center 2011). For the UA measure, we took an average value when a contract spanned multiple countries.
Dummy variables.
We captured the other variablesexclusivity (E), guaranteed sales (GS), minimum payment (MPAY), and advance payment (AP)-using dummy variables. We also included a dummy variable (MC) to capture any effect of using multicountry contracts.
Other control variables. To evaluate the licensing capability of each licensor, we asked licensing industry experts to indicate on a seven-point scale (anchored with "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree") whether "this licensor has extensive licensing capabilities." We used the averages across respondents to form the licensor capability score. Nine experts participated, all leaders in their field with an average of 22.4 years of licensing industry-specific experience. The average self-confidence in their responses was 6.33 out of 7.00. External measures of brand reputation (BR) were not available for several of the brands in our data set. Therefore, we turned to licensing industry experts to assess the "brand's reputation in its primary industry compared to competitors" on a seven-point rating scale ranging from "an extremely poor reputation" to "an extremely strong reputation." Eleven industry experts with an average of 21 years of experience in the licensing industry provided brand evaluation information. The experts had extensive experience with the major product categories pertaining to the contracts in our database. We were able to obtain multiple expert evaluations for all but four brands, and we averaged the responses. Experts rated their self-reported confidence in their brand evaluations on average as 6.5 out of 7, with 7 representing the highest level of confidence. To assess the validity of the expert ratings, we correlated them with measures of worldwide brand share for a subset of the brands (47) and obtained a significant correlation of .60 (p < .001).
Testing the Hypotheses
We estimated the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. However, because the dependent variable is a percentage measure, we did a logit transformation of the proportions to ensure that the predicted values fall between 0 and 1. We also determined whether relationships between independent variables and royalty rate changed across countries, because contracts are nested within countries. However, using hierarchical linear models did not provide evidence that the relationships varied across country clusters: Hierarchical linear models and OLS regression provided the same results, so we proceeded to employ OLS. We estimated the following model:
where RR = royalty rate, BR = brand reputation, CD = contract duration, GS = guaranteed sales, MPAY = minimum payment, AP = advance payment, E = exclusivity, LC = licensor capability, MC = 1 for multicountry contracts and 0 otherwise, IPRP = international property rights protection, MS = market size, and UA = uncertainty avoidance.
We took natural logs of all nondummy variable measures. Table 2 shows the correlations of the variables. The adjusted R-square of the model was .51. 
Results
The estimation provided support for five of our hypotheses. Our data support H 1 , which proposed that IPRP has a negative impact on royalty rate (-.95, p < .05). As we expected in H 2 , market size had a positive association with royalty rate (.39, p < .05). H 3 , which predicted that market size would enhance the royalty rate for a given level of IPRP, was also supported (1.20, p < .05). In contrast, H 4 was not confirmed, because UA did not have a significant effect on royalty rate, and H 5 was not supported, because market size did not have a significant moderating effect on the relationship between UA and royalty rate. As we predicted in H 6 and H 7 , contract duration (-.25, p < .05) and exclusivity (-.70, p < .05) had negative associations with royalty rate. We did not find support for H 8 , H 9 , or H 10 : Sales guarantee and advance payment did not have significant associations with royalty rate, and minimum payment was positively associated with royalty rate (.44, p < .05). Moreover, the use of contracts that covered multiple countries did not affect the results. Brand reputation and licensor capability did not have significant effects on royalty rate. We discuss the results and their implications in the following sections.
Discussion
Effect of IPRP on Licensor Risk Perception
Licensors seem to perceive greater risk from licensee opportunism, and therefore greater risk to their brand, when IPRP is low, which results in higher licensing costs, possibly because of the need for additional monitoring. The expectation of higher licensing costs in these markets limits the licensor from offering lower royalty rates as an incentive for licensees to align interests. This view received support from the managers that we interviewed. Regarding markets with poor IPRP, a manager advised to "go for a higher royalty rate, because that way you are getting incremental revenue to fight that battle; basically, you're saying it's tougher, you're going to pay me more so I'm not incurring all the cost to protect myself because your country doesn't do a good job." Thus, for a brand licensed in a low-IPRP market such as China and a high-IPRP market such as the United Kingdom, licensee opportunism will be more likely in China than in the United Kingdom because it has less reliable legal safeguards. Consequently, relative to the United Kingdom, the marginal value of monitoring the licensee will be higher in China, and these monitoring costs could be recovered through a higher royalty rate. Overall, variation in IPRP across markets will change the relative likelihood and cost of licensee opportunism, while a corresponding change in licensor opportunism is unlikely. Therefore, royalty rate varies with IPRP such that the licensor's primary preference (low royalty rate to incentivize the licensee) is more feasible in markets with more IPRP because countries with less IPRP will have a higher royalty rate to capture incremental monitoring costs. 
Market Size and Licensee Risk Perception
Market size has a positive association with royalty rate, as we expected. The marginal value of the support that the licensee receives from the licensor is higher in larger markets. Furthermore, the potential loss to a licensee from licensor opportunism increases with market size and shifts the negotiating position in favor of the licensor. In addition, opportunity cost to the licensor for not entering the market directly increases with market size, motivating direct entry unless higher royalty rates are paid. For example, if a brand has licensing arrangements in a large market such as India and a smaller market such as Sri Lanka, ceteris paribus, the licensor would be more likely to enter the Indian market directly if it does not receive an acceptable royalty rate. The risk that the licensor faces from licensee opportunism is unlikely to increase with market size.
In addition, we find that market size attenuates the negative relationship between IPRP and royalty rate. When we examined the interaction through the Aiken and West procedure (see Figure 2) , in low-IPRP markets, we found no significant change in royalty rate as market size changes (p < .05). However, in higher-IPRP markets, an increase in market size results in higher royalty rates (p < .05) because it changes the incentive balance between the licensor and the licensee. In high-IPRP markets, an increase in market size enhances the marginal value of licensor support and the risk of licensor opportunism, enhancing the royalty rate. In low-IPRP markets, the greater cost of monitoring enhances the royalty rate, regardless of market size. Given the already high royalty levels in low-IPRP markets, it may not be feasible for the licensor to further increase royalty rates as market size increases without substantially reducing the licensee's incentive to cooperate. This result suggests that the negative relationship observed between IPRP and royalty rate is typically prevalent when markets of high IPRP are relatively small. In high-IPRP/small markets, the primary reason for licensing may be to retain rights to the brand rather than to generate revenue. In such cases, the licensor may be more willing to accept a lower royalty rate to incentivize a competent and reliable licensee.
Other Variables
Contracts with exclusive rights had lower royalty rates, as did contracts of longer duration, both reflecting licensors' desire to obtain competent licensees in such situations. These results imply that when a licensor seeks exclusive or long-term relationships, it may be more concerned with finding licensees that are reliable and, thus, less likely to compromise the brand. Therefore, licensors may be willing to settle for lower royalty rates, consistent with Quelch's (1985) observation that licensors offer lower royalty rates to reliable licensees. This finding also highlights the importance that licensors afford to brand protection: when they engage in exclusive or long-term contracts, the focus is not merely on maximizing revenue. Sales guarantees and advance payments offered by licensees did not affect royalty rates, suggesting that they may not serve as bonds that reduce the perceived risk of licensee moral hazard. There was a positive relationship between minimum payment and royalty rate, implying that minimum payment might be a reflection of licensor strength, which enhances the royalty rate. The control variable, licensor capability, did not affect royalty rates. It is possible that other variables might capture this feature's effect. For example, the more capable licensors also seem to be the ones with stronger brands (correlation of .47).
We find that brand reputation has no significant effect on royalty rate. This surprising result may be because, in many cases, the brand is licensed in a foreign market to ensure that the licensor retains the rights to the trademark. In such cases, although the incremental revenue that accrues to the licensor is welcome, it might be less of a concern than protecting the brand (Quelch 1985) . As such, royalty rates may be less dependent on the strength of the brand than on country-related factors.
Contributions and Implications for Practice and Theory
The current research provides several insights that should be of relevance to academics and managers. First, we high- 
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Royalty Rate
Low market size High market size light the importance of global brand licensing to marketers as a strategic tool. Given the higher economic growth rates in various countries outside the United States, many of them in emerging markets, marketers need to have a better understanding of this brand development strategy. As more firms are "born global" and have an immediate Internet presence available to consumers worldwide, the importance of expeditiously registering their IP (e.g., brands) abroad and using their brands in overseas markets to retain rights to the brand makes licensing a potentially much more relevant tool. This is even more important given that small firms with great brand potential may initially have fewer internal resources to develop their brands overseas. A new firm might opt to license its brand in strategic overseas markets to simultaneously build and protect its brand. Second, we highlight the role of concerns about protecting the brand in brand licensing. Although the marketing field considers protection of brand assets importantindeed, Day (2011) suggests that it is a strategic imperative for marketers-academic research has not paid much attention to this issue. In this article, we explain brand protection more broadly, not only as involving a brand's protection against mishandling by others but also as the need to safeguard rights in foreign markets through active brand use. The failure to do so can result in brand owners needing to buy back their brand names in these markets, leading to unexpected delays and increased cost. We discuss brand protection as an underlying concern in the context of global brand licensing and explore its role in shaping royalty rate. Quelch (1985) observes that under certain circumstances, managers should be prepared to trade off revenue against the need to protect the brand. In this article, we discuss some conditions under which these circumstances may occur.
Third, we emphasize the role of IPRP in brand management. Although it is evident that the extent to which IP is protected in a market has a significant impact on a firm's ability to prevent misuse of its property, the marketing literature has not provided much attention to this issue. We address this gap.
Fourth, this article examines how royalty rate varies across international markets on the basis of market characteristics. As we noted previously, efforts to explain such variation are rare, even in the more well-established related franchising literature. We hope that our preliminary effort in this regard spurs interest in this topic.
Fifth, although prior research has examined franchising, it differs from licensing in that the franchisor has much more control over the franchisee, which must adopt the franchisor's business model completely. Brand licensing, in comparison, does not involve adoption of the business model and may span product categories and markets that are both familiar and unfamiliar to the licensor. Our article examines how licensors attempt to protect the brand through a business arrangement in which they have less control over the brand's management.
Implications for Licensors and Licensees
The results show how brand licensors can use IPRP to assess the risk their brand faces in a global market, evaluate the need for monitoring, and adjust royalty rates on the basis of such an assessment. Brand licensors can also gain insights into how market size can be used to negotiate higher royalty rates. Licensees can gain deeper understanding of licensor motivations, which will help them shape durable and more successful contracts. The results also provide information about the relationships between the various contract characteristics that influence royalty rates. Thus, firms may gain some insight into how various choices made in structuring brand licensing contracts can influence royalty rates. Overall, the study sheds light on factors that enable licensors and licensees to balance their interests in the context of brand licensing.
The findings are particularly useful to licensors, because they demonstrate how brand licensing may differ from technology licensing. In technology licensing, licensors offer low royalty rates as an incentive to limit licensee moral hazard when IPRP is low (Park and Lippoldt 2005) . In brand licensing, our results show that the reverse may be the case: higher royalty rates prevail when IPRP is low because the risk to the brand and the accompanying costs of monitoring are greater. As one of the executives we interviewed noted, "If you lose control of things, you run the risk of diluting your brand," referring to the need to carefully monitor licensee activities in such markets. Higher costs of monitoring can arise in the case of brands because they can be more easily violated or misappropriated; in contrast, technical expertise is required to copy a technology. Higher costs of monitoring a brand could also be a consequence of its longer life as an asset compared with the life of a technology patent. This result must be further clarified through direct testing of technology licensing and brand licensing contracts.
From our results, firms concerned with committing significant capital by entering markets with poor IPPR may consider entering these markets by licensing and "managing" their risk. Although these markets carry risk to a firm's brands, if the risk is managed through greater monitoring supported by higher royalty rates, the benefits may outweigh the risks. Brand managers, in this regard, might consider collaborating with corporate risk managers at their companies to build their foreign market entry strategies.
Implications for Theory
Our results show how licensors and licensees can protect their interests while structuring brand licensing contracts. From a theoretical perspective, the study illustrates the twosided nature of agency issues in brand licensing agreements, particularly for international contracts. Although economics literature has addressed two-sided agency issues (e.g., Lafontaine 1992), these issues have not received much attention in the marketing literature. The two-sided agency formulation employed here shows situations in which the principal is not risk averse and in which both the principal and the agent take their relative risk into account while structuring agency contracts. A key contribution of this research is its extension of agency theory to a context in which the principal and agent interact to manage an intangible asset. In addition, the use of actual contract data to examine an agency theory-based prediction is rare in the literature stream (for an exception, see Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) .
This study emphasizes the need to protect marketing assets. Brand violation devalues the brand, compromises revenues, and reduces a marketer's ability to fully leverage the equity of the brand (Day 2011) . Therefore, the protection of brand property must be given importance in the discussion of marketing assets. Relatedly, our results highlight concerns that arise in the management of intangible assets, which can be more easily misused. It is expensive and difficult to monitor these violations. As one licensing executive told us, "Dilution of the brand is the biggest risk [in licensing]." Importantly, although we do not directly test this, our findings imply that, in the context of licensing, not all intangible assets can be treated similarly. For example, brand assets may need more protection than technology assets because of their longer-term value and relative ease of violation. In an era of global brand management, when brand assets are often the most significant part of a firm's value (Day 2011) , it is important to evaluate strategies to protect such assets.
Limitations and Directions for Further Research
The study is based on cross-sectional data, which typically limits the ability to draw causal conclusions. However, this is not a critical issue in the context of this study, because our objective is to analyze the variation in royalty rate on the basis of market characteristics that influence risk perceptions of both the licensor and the licensee. A cross-sectional comparison is more feasible in this context, especially because some of the country characteristics we consider do not change much over the relatively short time frames.
We could not obtain brand reputation measures for all brands in our data set from secondary sources. This led to our decision to use industry experts to rate the brands. The strong correlations of the expert assessment of brand reputation with archival measures of market share for those brands (where such measures were available) should alleviate concerns of the validity of this measure. Furthermore, we obtained multiple raters for nearly all the brands included in the study. Regardless, we did not offer hypotheses for the impact of brand reputation on royalty rate. We were also unable to obtain fine-grained measures for market sizes for specific brands in the country markets where they were licensed. Instead, we relied on GDP to assess market size. Not all the contracts were drawn up for operation in a single country. Although we tried to limit the data to contracts drawn for similar countries and used a dummy variable to rule out whether multicountry contracts had an effect on the results, it would be ideal to use only singlecountry contracts. These are issues that must be addressed in further research, especially given the relatively small sample size used in this study.
We did not find support for hypotheses regarding the influence of UA (H 4 -H 5 ), and it is possible that this result is due to weaknesses in the measure. We decided to use Hofstede's (1980) measure partly because the measures have repeatedly been subjected to replication and have typically been found to have validity (Brock et al. 2008; Husted 1999; Shackleton and Ali 1990; Sondergaard 1994) . However, there is ample criticism of Hofstede's measures, and using the index values at the country level may not have enabled us to adequately measure culture at the level of the individual respondent or firm. Further research exploring the impact of culture on licensing contracts would benefit from primary data from actual respondents rather than the use of an aggregate measure.
Using data from licensing contracts, we find evidence that supports a two-sided moral hazard argument based on agency theory. However, due to limited data availability, we could not examine the conditions under which different payment structures, such as fixed fees and royalty rates, are used. We had no contracts that employed a fixed fee payment in our data. However, there are contracts in other areas of licensing, such as technology licensing, that employ fixed-fee payment structures. Fixed payments are also more popular when licensed products are components in a system and individual sales for the licensed products are difficult to establish (Johnson 2001) . It is also possible that competitiveness of the category and distribution channel structure could influence royalty rate because the licensee competes to stay financially viable. Further research is warranted here.
By collecting primary data, researchers can examine the relative impact of the motivation to protect the brand and enhance revenues on royalty rates. In this study, an underlying postulate is that the negative impact of IPRP on royalty rates is driven by the licensor's desire to protect the brand. Although our findings lend credence to this assumption, a direct test of the relative roles of brand protection and revenue generation will help managers gain greater insights into the interplay between these two (sometimes conflicting) objectives in brand licensing. In addition, we suggest that royalty rates increase with market size because of the licensee's desire to ensure support from the licensor. A direct test of this premise through primary data will help shed further light on the incentive-alignment process that shapes brand licensing contracts. Finally, an assessment of the impact of licensor and licensee characteristics on moral hazard concerns through the collection of primary data will help confirm and extend the findings from this research.
From a public policy perspective, there is a concern that strong IPRP will shift income to IP-exporting countries and might affect the establishment of such regimes in a country (Maskus 2000) . Notably, in this study, we find that higher IPRP benefits firms in the importer nation because the licensee is likely to receive a lower royalty rate. As such, brand licensees should retain more of their earnings when the IP regime in their country provides adequate protection to IP rights. A direct empirical assessment of this strategy should be of interest to public policy scholars.
Directly contrasting brand and technology licensing will also provide insights into how the nature of IP affects the appropriability of returns. The influence of IPRP on licensing may vary by product characteristics, particularly the content and boundaries of knowledge that is protected (Anand and Khanna 2000; Park and Lippoldt 2005) . Although Park and Lippoldt (2005) awareness of dissimilarities in how firms license various kinds of IP will be beneficial. Ambler (2003) notes that brand management involves trade-offs between leveraging the brand to enhance cash flows and preventing the brand from dilution. This study provides some insight into this trade-off in a licensing context. However, a deeper understanding of the nature of these compromises and their contextual variations is required to provide brand managers with appropriate guidance in leveraging and sustaining their brand.
